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SETTLEMENT OF SECURITIES LITIGATION
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF SECURITIES
WITHOUT REGISTRATION: THE USE OF
SECTION 3(a)(10) IN SEC ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS
SEYMOUR GLANZER, * HOWARD SCHIFFMAN" AND
MARK PACKMAN***
INTRODUCTION
SECTION 3(a)(10)1 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Act or 1933 Act)2
exempts from the registration requirements of the Act' securities
issued in exchange for legal claims, property, or other securities when
a court or other competent tribunal has approved the transaction after
holding an adversary hearing on its fairness. Historically, the section
3(a)(10) exemption has been utilized in three instances: (1) settlement
of private litigation; 4 (2) reorganization of insolvent business entities
* Partner, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin; B.S. 1955, Juilliard-New York University;
LL.B. 1960, New York Law School; former Chief, Fraud Section, United States
Attorney's Office, District of Columbia; former Attorney, Securities and Exchange
Commission.
* * Associate, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin; B.A. 1973, Colgate University; J.D.
1977, Fordham University; former Trial Counsel, Division of Enforcement, Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission.
*** Associate, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin; B.A. 1977, Princeton University; J.D.
1980, Georgetown University.
The authors were counsel to certain of the settling defendants in SEC v. Blinder
Robinson & Co. and were responsible for the presentation of evidence at the
§ 3(a)(10) fairness hearing held in that case.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1976). Section 3(a)(10) exempts from the registration
requirements of the Act "[a]ny security which is issued in exchange for one or more
bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests... where the terms
and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the
fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to
issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court.' Id., see
Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
794 (1943) (trial court erred in holding securities not subject to registration when it
failed to hold fairness hearing).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1976).
3. Section 5(a) of the 1933 Act prohibits the sale of securities unless a registra-
tion statement is in effect. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976). Section 5(c) prohibits the offer
of securities unless a registration statement has been filed. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976).
4. A large majority of SEC no action letters relating to the use of § 3(a)(10) in
litigation settlements involve shareholders' actions under the civil liability provisions
of the securities laws. See J. Hicks, Exempted Transactions Under the Securities Act
of 1933 § 3.02[2][a] n.5 (rev. ed. 1981).
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outside of bankruptcy proceedings; 5 and (3) reorganization of solvent
business entities.6 Although section 3(a)(10) has been used with in-
creasing frequency in recent years for settlements of private litiga-
tion, 7 until recently no court or administrative agency had defined
"fairness" for purposes of determining whether the exemption ap-
plies.8
In SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co.,9 a federal district court made
two significant contributions to the expanded use of section 3(a)(10).
For the first time a court used section 3(a)(10) to exempt securities
issued pursuant to the settlement of an action brought by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 10 Equally important, the
court articulated standards to be used in determining the fairness of
the settlement. I
Part I of this Article analyzes Blinder Robinson in light of its novel
application of section 3(a)(10). Part II discusses standards to govern
section 3(a)(10) hearings based upon the Blinder Robinson decision.12
As part of this discussion, practical suggestions are made as to the type
of evidence that should be offered to establish the fairness of the
settlement.
5. Although the exemption is available in bankruptcy proceedings, see 1 L.
Loss, Securities Regulation 64-67 (2d ed. 1961), in such instances, most issuers rely on
the exemptions from registration contained in the federal bankruptcy laws. See 11
U.S.C. § 1145 (Supp. [ 1978) (formerly 11 U.S.C. §§ 664(a)(2), 793(a)(2) (1976));
Ash, Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1980).
6. Corporations undergoing a reorganization of this nature have most readily
availed themselves of § 3(a)(10). They may use the exemption when they reorganize
through exchange offers, exchange agreements, statutory mergers or consolidations,
or purchases of assets for stock. See Ash, supra note 5, at 42-45; Mann, The Section
3(a)(10) Exemption: Recent Interpretations, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1247, 1248-49
(1975).
7. See Ash, supra note 5, at 30-31, 38-39.
8. See id. at 17.
9. 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981).
10. Although most of the private litigation using § 3(a)(10) had been based on
alleged securities violations, see supra note 4, this was the first time the section was
applied in settling a government enforcement action under the securities laws.
11. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1981). The
definition of "fairness" for purposes of the exemption is particularly noteworthy
because its appearance in the 1933 Act seems contrary to the underlying philosophy
of the Act. The 1933 Act is not concerned with policing the fairness of business
investments. Its disclosure requirements are based on the notion that an informed
individual-not the SEC or any federal court-should judge the fairness of a particu-
lar investment. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 5, at 121-27. Thus, the requirement in
§ 3(a)(10) that a judge must determine the "fairness" of an issuance appears contrary
to the policy of the Act. See Ash, supra note 5, at 5. In Blinder Robinson, however,
the court interpreted the word in a manner consistent with the policy of the Act by
focusing on the fairness of the disclosures made pursuant to the proposed issuance
rather than judging the fairness of the settlement from a monetary standpoint. 511 F.
Supp. at 802.
12. When appropriate, this Article will compare the § 3(a)(10) fairness standards
with the fairness criteria used to judge class action settlements. Note, however, that
(Vol. 50
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I. SEC v. BLINDER ROBINSON & CO.-
AN ANALYSIS
In Blinder Robinson, the SEC brought a civil injunctive action
against American Leisure Corporation (ALC), its principal officers,
its underwriter and others,1 3 charging violation of the antifraud provi-
sions of the securities laws.' 4 The allegations of the complaint cen-
tered on ALC's all-or-nothing best-efforts' 5 public offering of ten
million units of its common stock and warrants. Specifically, the SEC
charged that the defendants had failed to disclose material changes in
the public offering plan that created the appearance that the offering
had sold out during the offering period.' In addition to an injunc-
tion, the SEC sought the ancillary remedy of rescission of the public
offering. 17
At the time of the complaint, the issuer, ALC, was in a develop-
mental stage, with an elaborate plan to build a hotel-casino complex
in Atlantic City, New Jersey. ALC had acquired land for the project,
commissioned and received architectural designs, and begun the proc-
ess of obtaining a casino license and other required permits from
although similarities exist, one important distinction is that here the judge determines
the adequacy of the disclosure, while in a class action the judge must determine the
fairness of the entire settlement. See 3 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §
5600a, at 494 n.20 (1977).
13. The SEC sued the issuer, American Leisure Corporation, the underwriter,
two additional corporations and the chief executive officers of each. Complaint, SEC
v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981). The authors served as
counsel to the president of ALC, Nathan S. Jacobson, and the secretary and treasurer
of ALC, Irwin S. Lampert.
14. Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D.
Colo. 1981). The alleged violations involved primarily § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rules lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1981), and lOb-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1981), promulgated there-
under.
15. In best-efforts underwriting, an underwriter does not oblige itself to sell all of
the issuer's stock but rather undertakes to use its best efforts to do so. I L. Loss, supra
note 5, at 171. "The securities house, instead of buying the issue from the company
and reselling it as principal, sells it for the company as agent; and its compensation
takes the form of an agent's commission rather than a merchant's or dealer's profit."
Id. (emphasis omitted). In an all-or-nothing offering, the issuer agrees to refund the
proceeds of the offering to purchasers if the offering does not sell out. G. Robinson,
Going Public: Successful Securities Underwriting § 22, at 95 (K. Eppler 2d ed. 1971).
16. Complaint at 14-18, SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D.
Colo. 1981). The complaint sought injunctive and other equitable relief, including
rescission and an accounting. This Article is concerned with the settlement between
defendant ALC and its officers and the SEC. Certain other defendants entered into
separate settlement agreements. In July, 1981, the federal district court in Denver
tried the case against the underwriter and its president, the only remaining defend-
ants. At this writing, no decision has been handed down by the court.
17. Id. at 18.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
various state regulatory agencies."' Because ALC was in a develop-
mental stage, rescission would have forced it to liquidate, resulting in
the shareholders suffering a substantial discount for their shares.',
To avoid the prospect of costly litigation and the possibility of
liquidation, ALC and two of its officers agreed to a settlement with
the SEC. The agreement provided that the issuer would exchange
additional shares of its stock and promissory notes for the release of
any potential legal claims of shareholders and former shareholders
who chose to participate in the settlement. 20 Because the settlement
proposed the issuance of securities, the question arose whether a regis-
tration statement had to be filed. The preparation of a registration
statement in this situation was not only impractical because of the cost
and time that would be incurred, but also presented difficult disclo-
sure questions concerning the characterization of the litigation and
the settlement. 21 Accordingly, counsel for the settling defendants
suggested the use of the section 3(a)(10) exemption from registration.
The court first made a preliminary finding that section 3(a)(10) was
applicable.2 2 After setting a date for the fairness hearing, the court
18. Memorandum of Defendants ALC, Nathan Jacobson and Irwin Lampert in
Support of Proposed Settlement at 3-7, SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp.
799 (D. Colo. 1981) thereinafter cited as Defendants' Memorandum].
19. As the court pointed out, there was not enough cash for complete restitution.
511 F. Supp. at 802. Further, the devaluation of assets that would result from a
forced sale and the administrative expenses incurred would inevitably result in a
discount. See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 18, at 19.
20. Specifically, defendants ALC, Jacobson and Lampert agreed to entry of a
final order requiring future compliance with certain provisions of the federal secur-
ities laws. The order also offered a 10 % stock bonus to nearly all ALC shareholders of
record on February 13, 1981, upon their tender to ALC of a Proof of Claim and
Release. Shareholders who had purchased stock of ALC during the public offering
period, December 26, 1979 to March 25, 1980, were offered the alternative of
receiving a secured five year, eight percent interest bearing promissory note upon
tender of their shares to ALC along with a Proof of Claim and Release. Finally, to
those who had purchased shares in the public offering and who had sold them at a
loss before February 13, 1981, ALC offered a promissory note in the amount of the
loss upon receipt of a Proof of Claim and Release. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co.,
No. 80-M-1125, final order at 4-7 (D. Colo. Apr. 14, 1981).
21. A registration statement for securities issued in settlement of an SEC injunc-
tive action would have to describe the circumstances of the initial offering and the
ensuing litigation. See Regulation S-K, item 5, 17 C.F.R. 229.20: (1981) (issuer must
describe material legal proceedings). It is precisely these circumstances, however,
that are in sharp dispute in an SEC suit. Consequently, it would be virtually
impossible for the SEC and the settling defendants to agree on the wording of the
registration statement. Moreover, where factual disputes exist, the facts that defend-
ants are forced to disclose in a registration statement may be interpreted as admis-
sions in the SEC suit or in any subsequent litigation. By contrast, in a fairness hearing
the defendants are not forced to confront these difficult issues because both the court,
by virtue of its familiarity with the case, and the shareholders, by virtue of the notice
they receive pursuant to § 3(a)(10), are aware of the disputed circumstances of the
initial offering.
22. See SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799, 800 (D. Colo. 1981).
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interpreted the statute's provision for a "hearing . .. at which all
persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities .. shall have the
right to appear" 23 to require written notification to all shareholders.2 4
Consequently, notice was sent to approximately eleven thousand
shareholders detailing the settlement and apprising them of their right
to appear at the fairness hearing to voice their approval or objections
to the proposed settlement plan.25 Prior to the hearing, counsel for all
parties submitted briefs on the fairness issue and several shareholders
submitted written objections. -6
At the hearing, the settling defendants presented evidence similar to
the type of information typically found in registration statements. In
general, the evidence concerned the use of the funds obtained from
ALC's public offering. Testifying in support of the settlement, the
chief operating officer of ALC detailed ALC's plans for the construc-
tion and operation of a hotel-casino in Atlantic City. This evidence
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1976).
24. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., No. 80-M-1125 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 1981)
(order setting hearing date and directing notification of shareholders). Because the
settlement potentially affects the property interests of so many, adequate notice and
an opportunity to object are particularly important. The SEC, however, has not yet
specified the method or scope of notice required by the exemption. Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e), settlement of a class action may not occur without the court's approval
after notice has been sent to interested parties "in such manner as the court directs."
Id. Although the SEC has acknowledged that a notice procedure that complies with
rule 23(e) satisfies the notice requirement of § 3(a)(10), the SEC has declined to
incorporate the Federal Rules standard into the exemption. See J. Hicks, supra note
4, § 3.02[4][a], at 3-37 (citing Mackey Int'l Inc., No Action Letter from SEC, 1974
CCH Fed. Sec. Microfilm roll 3, frame 03484 (Feb. 25, 1974)).
25. The notice procedure instituted in Blinder Robinson would seem particularly
suited to ensure complete protection of interested parties. The court ordered that
defendants send written notice of the hearing by first class mail to all shareholders.
The notice was to contain the material terms of the proposed settlement and a clear
explanation of the shareholders' right to appear at the hearing and object to the
settlement. In addition, the same notice of hearing and proposed settlement was to be
published in a newspaper of general circulation where the largest number of share-
holders would probably be found, in this case the Denver, Colorado area. Finally,
defendants were to file an affidavit with the court explaining how and when the
hearing notice had been completed. After the hearing, all shareholders were to be
sent notice by first class mail that the settlement had been approved and were to be
advised of their opportunity to "opt in," or participate. SEC v. Blinder Robinson &
Co., No. 80-M-1125 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 1981) (order preliminarily approving settle-
ment).
26. The majority of objections sought total rescission or a higher rate of interest.
See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 18, exhibits 1-10. In its subsequent ap-
proval of the settlement, the court did not specifically explain why it found these
objections unpersuasive. It did find important, however, that the shareholders were
not forced to participate in the settlement and, therefore, could seek greater recover)'
by pursuing private claims for relief. 511 F. Supp. at 801.
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included copies of contracts, 27 architectural drawings28 and informa-
tion concerning ALC's progress in obtaining the approval of regula-
tory authorities, 29 as well as prospects for establishing business opera-
tions. 30 In addition, expert testimony was presented concerning the
financial condition of the company, the value of the proposed settle-
ment to shareholders, the trading activity in the issuer's stock and the
probable financial consequences of continued litigation and rescis-
sion. 3' All persons appearing in the proceeding were given an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to be heard. 32 Finally, and
most significantly, attorneys for the SEC offered an official letter
from the secretary of the Commission stating that the Commission
had reviewed and approved the settlement. 33
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge announced his approval
of the settlement 3' and established a schedule for its implementa-
tion.35 The schedule provided that ALC would send to all share-
holders a Proof of Claim and Release form, 3  which the shareholders
had to complete within approximately sixty days to participate in the
settlement. 37 Shareholders who did not return the Proof of Claim
and Release were not bound by the settlement and had the option of
bringing a private action against the settling defendants. Further, the
court ordered ALC's counsel to review all claims and submit to the
SEC and ALC a report listing all claims received, approved and
rejected. ALC was obliged to pay the claims approved within thirty
days after receipt of the report unless the SEC or ALC filed written
objections within fifteen days. With respect to the claims objected to,
27. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 54, 59, SEC v. Blinder Robinson &
Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (evidence introduced on April 10, 1981).
28. Id. at 42.
29. Id. at 61-65.
30. Id. at 43-52.
31. Id. at 86-109.
32. Some shareholders took the opportunity to voice their opinions on the fairness
of the settlement. Id. at 136-41.
33. Id. at 117. It should be noted that the SEC approved the settlement in its role
as a litigant. Accordingly, the Commission's deliberations regarding the settlement
were not open to the public, and no opinion was issued. The Commission merely
issued a one sentence statement that the settlement had been approved. To date,
then, the Commission has given no indication of the criteria it may use in determin-
ing whether to approve future settlements under § 3(a)(10).
34. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings: Findings at 11, SEC v, Blinder Robin-
son & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (statement of Judge Matsch on Apr. 14,
1981).
35. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., No. 80-M-1125, final order at 6 (D. Colo.
Apr. 14, 1981).
36. Id. exhibit A.
37. The court approved the settlement on April 10. Id. exhibit A. The terms of
the settlement provided that shareholders who wished to participate were required to
complete and return the Proof of Claim and Release form by June 12.
[Vol. 50
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the court ordered the SEC and ALC to confer with ALC's counsel to
resolve the dispute. The court retained jurisdiction to settle any dis-
putes not resolved by this informal procedure. 38
Court approval did not entail evaluation of the monetary terms of
the settlement. This was left to the parties in the litigation and those
shareholders who agreed to participate. Approval, however, did re-
quire the court to confront the novel issue of what standard to apply
to ascertain fairness in a section 3(a)(10) hearing.
II. STANDARDS FOR DErERmINING FAINESS
UNDER SECrION 3(a)(10)
Section 3(a)(10) furthers the underlying purpose of the 1933 Act-
protection of investors through full disclosure of material
information 39-by requiring court approval of the fairness of the
terms of a proposed settlement. 40 The Blinder Robinson court began
its fairness analysis, however, with the observation that "[t]here is no
statutory definition of 'fairness' as used in Section 3(a)(10) and there is
no general guidance suggesting the criteria for the court to consider in
determining the question of approval." 41 One commentator examin-
ing the issue had suggested that courts should follow the general rule
that approval should be given if the "settlement . . .offered is ...
'fair', 'reasonable', and 'adequate'," 42 a rule derived principally from
cases decided under rules 23(e) and 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 43 These federal rules concern court approval for the set-
tlement of class actions and derivative suits, respectively. In addition
to the express requirements of the rules, courts have developed a series
38. Id. at 6-7.
39. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
40. Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335, 341 (9th Cir.) (§ 3(a)(10)
exemption not available without a fairness hearing), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794
(1943).
41. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1981);
accord Ash, supra note 5, at 17. The legislative history of § 3(a)(10) is singularly
unhelpful. Nowhere does it shed light on the meaning of the term "fairness." For a
summary of the legislative history, see J. Hicks, supra note 4, § 3.01[2].
42. J. Hicks, supra note 4, § 3.02[4][b], at 3-41. See generally, Dole, The
Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 971, 980 (1971);
Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions-Part II: The Settle-
ment, 23 Sw. L.J. 765, 792 (1969).
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 23.1. Rule 23(e) provides as follows: "A class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Rule 23.1, which applies to
shareholders' derivative suits, provides in relevant part: "The action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
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of standards for evaluating the fairness of such settlements."4 A typi-
cal expression of these criteria can be found in the Second Circuit's
opinion in Newman v. Stein: 45
[T]he role of a court in passing upon the propriety of the settlement
* . . is a delicate one .... [S]ince " '[t]he very purpose of a com-
promise is to avoid the trial of sharply disputed issues and to
dispense with wasteful litigation', the court must not turn the
settlement hearing 'into a trial or a rehearsal of the trial'." Rather
.. . it must reach "an intelligent and objective opinion of the
probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be litigated" and
"form an educated estimate of the complexity, expense, and likely
duration of such litigation . . . and all other factors relevant to a
full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed compro-
mise."46
Against this background, the Blinder Robinson court drew a dis-
tinction between the proposed settlement in the case before it and
other instances when courts have been asked to approve settlements.417
Although the court generally followed the standards used for the
approval of class action settlements, it was careful to distinguish them
from the criteria to be used in a section 3(a)(10) settlement:
The SEC is not here as the representative of a class of investors
claiming relief. Accordingly, this court is not confronted with mea-
suring the adequacy of the relief obtained by comparing the value
of the securities to be issued with the claims of loss, as would be
true in the settlement of a class action or a derivative action by
shareholders under Rules 23(e) and 23.1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ...
Indeed, the settlement specifically provides that those persons
who do not wish to accept the offer from the settling defendants are
not foreclosed from pursuing private claims for relief....
This is a situation in which the value of the stock and notes to be
issued must be considered speculative because the underlying busi-
ness is in a developmental stage. I have made no attempt to deter-
mine value, now or in the future, because the fairness of the offer
does not depend upon it. 48
44. See Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 691-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1039 (1972); Stull v. Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Patterson
v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384 F. Supp. 585, 587-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).
45. 464 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. .1039 (1972).
46. Id. at 691-92 (citations omitted) (quoting Haudek, supra note 42, at 795, and
Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968)).
47. SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1981).
48. Id. at 801 (citations omitted).
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The court also contrasted the section 3(a)(10) hearing with the
exemption from registration for securities issued in a corporate reor-
ganization governed by the former Bankruptcy Act, 49 which required
a finding that the plan of reorganization is fair, equitable and feasi-
ble.50 There, the necessary inquiry on "feasibility" required valua-
tion of the debtor's business as a going concern and the reasonableness
of the prospects for future financial success of the enterprise.5'
The court held that the proper approach to the question of fairness
is one that recognizes that "the purpose of the Securities Act of 1933
[is] to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of the information
believed to be necessary to the making of informed investment deci-
sions."52 The court saw the fairness hearing not as an opportunity to
determine the financial soundness of ALC or its securities, but rather
as
the functional equivalent of the full disclosure which would be
provided in an appropriate prospectus and registration statement.
Those receiving the offer under the terms of the settlement agree-
ment have had a full and fair opportunity to learn everything
required to make their decision. Accordingly, it must be concluded
that they will act in awareness of the risks involved in acceptance
and the alternatives attendant upon a decision to decline the offer.
Nothing more could be accomplished by registration and nothing
more is required in the determination that this settlement should be
approved.5
3
By refusing to determine the value of the securities offered in settle-
ment and to judge the adequacy of that value, the court recognized
that its role in a fairness hearing was to assess the quality of disclosure
rather than the quality of the securities being offered. To further this
goal, the court concluded that the following factors were to be consid-
ered in determining the fairness of the settlement:
(1) the recommendations of counsel; (2) the scope of the discovery
record as an indicator of the adequacy of the investigation into the
facts; (3) the apparent alternatives to the settlement; (4) the nature
and volume of responses from those receiving notice of the hearing;
and (5) the opportunity for direct participation in the process of
obtaining full disclosure.-
49. Id.
50. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 174, 216, 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 616 (1976) (repealed
1978).
51. 6A Collier on Bankruptcy 11.07, at 235 (L. King & A. Herzog rev. 14th ed.
1977).
52. 511 F. Supp. at 802.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 801.
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The court did not consider the complexity, expense, duration and risks
of the litigation if the settlement was not approved. These factors,
however, are also relevant to the issue of fairness.
A. Recommendations of Counsel
In considering settlement of class actions and derivative suits, courts
have traditionally presumed that the attorneys have negotiated in
good faith and, consequently, have given their recommendations sub-
stantial weight, particularly when the attorneys involved were experi-
enced and reputable and there was evidence of arm's length bargain-
ing.55 As one court put it, "a court should not substitute its judgment
for that of the parties who worked out the settlement, in the absence
of fraud, collusion or bad faith, or of evidence that the settlement,
taken as a whole, is so unfair as to preclude judicial approval."501
Similarly, Chief Judge Edelstein of the Southern District of New York
stated in approving a settlement:
This case presents very complex issues of knowledge, intent, mate-
riality, reliance and damages. Experienced and competent counsel
have assessed these problems and the probability of success on the
merits. They have concluded that compromise is well-advised and
necessary. The parties' decision regarding the respective merits of
their positions has an important bearing on this case.5 7
In an SEC enforcement proceeding, the court should place espe-
cially heavy reliance on the recommendations of counsel because in
such cases, unlike class actions or derivative suits, there is absolutely
no possibility that the settlement is merely an attempt to "buy off" the
plaintiff and his attorney.58  The plaintiff is the SEC, which has no
financial interest in the settlement and is solely interested in protect-
ing the investing public. Courts have traditionally paid great defer-
ence to the expertise of administrative agencies in regard to decisions
made concerning matters within the agencies' special competence.50
55. E.g., Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F. R.D. 597, 624 (D. Colo. 1974);
Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,955, at 90,516 (N.D. III. Jan. 28, 1971); see 3 H. Newberg, supra note
12, § 5610d; Haudek, supra note 42, at 798.
56. In re Four Seasons See. Laws Litig., 58 F.R.D. 19, 40 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
57. Lyons v. Marrud, Inc., (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,525, at 92,520 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1972) (class action alleging fraud in the
offering of securities). In Lyons, the court approved a proposed settlement represent-
ing 25% of maximum possible recovery in light of recommendations of counsel, lack
of objections and extensive pre-trial discovery. Id.
58. See 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1839, at 427-
28 (1969) (court approval is intended to discourage private settlement when plaintiff
and his attorney benefit to exclusion of others).
59. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 598 F.2d 62, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Thus, in an SEC enforcement proceeding the court should attribute
great significance to the fact that the SEC, the very agency charged
with enforcing the securities laws, has approved the settlement.
In Blinder Robinson, the court properly gave particular weight to
this factor, stating from the bench that
[a]mong the things that are to be considered are the recommenda-
tions of counsel, and in this regard I have considered not only the
statements of counsel made at this hearing this morning with re-
spect to the negotiating history, but also I take note of the earlier
proceedings in this case of which I have presided, and in which I
have noted that all counsel who are participating in submitting this
settlement have also participated in the aggressive representation of
their respective clients and their interests, and I have no doubt that
there is nothing collusive about this negotiated agreement.
I have in this case placed great reliance on the approval of this
settlement by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and that
exhibit which is the letter from the Secretary advising me of the
Commission's approval is, to my mind, the most important exhibit
received here.60
B. Amount of Discovery
The extent of discovery is a factor closely related to the recommen-
dations of counsel because a factual record developed through deposi-
tions and document production enables counsel for both sides to eval-
uate better the relative strengths and weaknesses of their respective
cases and thus facilitates settlement. This factor also provides the
court with a yardstick against which to measure counsel's recommen-
dations. Accordingly, although there is no precise formula for what
constitutes a sufficient record to enable a court to evaluate intelli-
gently a settlement of a class action or derivative suit, it is certain that
"[a]t minimum, the court must possess sufficient evidence to raise its
decision above mere conjecture.""' Ordinarily, a court asked to ap-
prove a settlement relies on the discovery already completed by the
parties and any other evidence they have marshalled in preparation
for the trial.6 2 Thus, the more discovery that has been completed, the
greater the chances for approval.
60. Reporters Transcript of Proceedings: Findings at 4, 5, 10, SEC v. Blinder
Robinson & Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (statement of judge Matsch on
Apr. 10, 1981).
61. 3 H. Newberg, supra note 12, § 5610b, at 497-98 (footnote omitted).
62. Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 967 (1976); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463-64 (2d Cir.
1974).
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Determining the amount of discovery obtained is equally important
in a section 3(a)(10) fairness hearing. The SEC, prior to bringing an
enforcement action, ordinarily will conduct an extensive administra-
tive investigation of the case to determine whether an action should be
brought. This investigative record is available to the court in the
settlement of an ensuing enforcement proceeding, together with any
discovery that has been taken by the SEC or the defendants. The court
is thus provided with an extensive evidentiary record upon which it
can base the decision.
It is interesting to note that in Blinder Robinson the court gave this
factor only limited weight, stating:
There has been time for a complete investigation into the facts in
this case and it is apparent that counsel have made full use of
discovery procedures. I have not examined the discovery record
because I will be the trier-of-fact on the issues [involving the non-
settling] parties and it would be inappropriate to obtain detailed
information before the trial. It is for the same reason that I have
avoided asking counsel to give any opinions concerning the relative
merits of the positions taken on behalf of the settling parties while
they were in an adversary posture. 3
In addition to the evidence available as the result of discovery, the
court may, of course, receive additional evidence at the fairness hear-
ing itself in the form of affidavits or live testimony. 4 The court also
has the discretion to relax the formal rules of evidence at the hearing
to facilitate the presentation of such additional evidence.05 Defend-
ant's counsel should take advantage of the relaxation of the rules to
present evidence not already before the court. Keeping in mind that
the hearing is taking the place of a written disclosure statement,
defendant's counsel should submit evidence similar to that found in a
registration statement and argue to the court that such evidence is
prima facie grounds for approval of the settlement.00
63. 511 F. Supp. at 801-02. As a practical matter, the court's reluctance to rely
heavily on the discovery documents is probably sound. First, in an SEC enforcement
context, it would be both unnecessary and unfair to require the judge to conduct an
extensive and time-consuming review. Second, when determining the fairness of
settlements, courts have traditionally looked to discovery largely in order to deter-
mine whether each side has had an adequate opportunity to make a reasonably
accurate assessment of its case. Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Slade v. Shearson, Hamill & Co., 79
F.R.D. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Because of the nature of an SEC enforcement
proceeding, in which extensive discovery has already been conducted at the investi-
gatory stage, lack of sufficient information about the strengths and weaknesses of
claims is unlikely.
64. Haudek, supra note 42, at 801.
65. Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F. Supp. 13, 19 (E.D. Mich. 1950), afJ'd sub norn.
Masterson v. Pergament, 203 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832 (1953).
66. Previously, in class actions, evidence submitted to assist the court in Its
determination has included testimony of investment bankers, professors of finance
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C. Alternatives to Settlement
Although the Blinder Robinson opinion described the third factor as
"the alternatives to settlement," this factor actually should focus on
the ability of the settling defendants to survive a judgment in an
amount greater than the settlement. In regard to this situation one
court has stated that "[a] settlement amount which would plunge the
defendants into immediate bankruptcy would not serve the best inter-
ests of the class of claimants.... The court then looks to the defend-
ants' ability to pay in weighing the strengths of the case and the
potential bounds of injury. 67
Expert testimony is particularly useful in informing the court of the
financial effects of settlement and its various alternatives. In Blinder
Robinson, the settling defendants introduced testimony of a chartered
financial analyst regarding the financial condition of ALC. He re-
viewed for the court the issuer's last periodic SEC filings and opined
that the issuer, being in a developmental stage, could not afford a cash
settlement. The expert went on to testify that rescission and full
restitution, the remedy originally sought by the SEC and certain
shareholders, would entail the liquidation of ALC. Furthermore, liq-
uidation would have resulted in the shareholders receiving substan-
tially less than their initial investment and would have rendered
worthless the value of certain capital assets of ALC, such as the
regulatory approval for the building of its planned casino.s Recog-
nizing the consequences of rescission to both ALC and its share-
holders, the court found the settlement to be a preferable alterna-
tive.69
This conclusion was undoubtedly correct, for in an SEC enforce-
ment action the alternative to settlement for shareholders would be to
file individual actions or a class action. The former alternative is
impractical given the amounts involved, and the latter is expensive
with no assurance of either class certification 70 or recovery. 7' Share-
and officers of the corporate defendant. Haudek, supra note 42, at 796-803. Simi-
larly, admission of such oral testimony is beneficial in a § 3(a)(10) hearing.
67. In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472 F. Supp. 1357, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 1979)
(footnote omitted), modified and remanded, 645 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1981). Rescission
has been granted in cases involving particularly egregious violations. See SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972) (rescission ordered where
antifraud provisions and prospectus delivery requirement of securities laws violated
in connection with an all-or-nothing public offering). No cases have used the remedy,
however, where liquidation would result. This is in keeping with the remedial rather
than punitive character of the 1933 Act. See generally SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); SEC v.
Franklin Atlas Corp., 171 F. Supp. 711, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
68. 511 F. Supp. at 802; see supra text accompanying note 30.
69. 511 F. Supp. at 802.
70. A. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present and Future 13
(2d ed. 1977) ("judge must make seven affirmative findings before the case can be
certified as a class action"); see H. Newberg, supra note 12, §§ 1030-1080.
71. 3 H. Newberg, supra note 12, § 6926e.
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holders would have to pay legal fees and expenses out of any recov-
ery, 72 which, on average, would reduce the amount of the recovery by
fifteen to twenty-five percent. 73 As in the case of an SEC enforce-
ment proceeding, if the class plaintiffs obtained rescission of the pub-
lic offering, the result would be liquidation of the issuer. Thus, assum-
ing, arguendo, that the shareholders could obtain complete rescission
in a class action, their recovery would probably be far less than would
result from the settlement. The vagaries of a class action contrast
sharply with the low risk associated with the settlement; the share-
holders will not have to expend money on litigation, take the chance
of failing to obtain class certification or losing on the merits, or having
to pay counsel a substantial portion of any recovery. The certainty of
relief for the shareholders provided by the settlement thus constitutes
a powerful argument for approval.
D. The Reaction of Those Directly Affected
by the Settlement and the Opportunity
for Direct Participation in the Process
of Obtaining Full Disclosure
Traditionally, courts have considered the lack of or small number
of objections an indication that the settlement is a fair one.7 1 One
commentator, however, cautions that "in sophisticated securities set-
tlements where the majority of absent class members are usually
unrepresented by counsel and possess insufficient knowledge to evalu-
ate the fairness of the settlement, such a conclusion may be dan-
gerous."75
It is evident that a settlement under section 3(a)(10) poses no such
dangers. Unlike a class action settlement, where a class member must
72. Id. § 6905a, at 1120; see 7A C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 58, § 1803.
73. See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 907, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(settlement notice restricted attorneys' fees to 25% of plaintiffs' recovery), rev'd on
other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir. 1977); Milstein v. Werner, 58 F.R.D. 544, 551
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court awarded attorneys' fees equal to 15% of the cash benefit
realized pursuant to the settlement of the class action); Volvovitz v. VTR, Inc.,
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 93,292 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
1971) (attorneys' fees equaled approximately 19% of plaintiffs' recovery); Fox v.
Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court granted attorneys'
fees equal to 16% of the settlement amount).
74. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1385
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (court approved settlement of a class action antitrust case based,
inter alia, on the small number of objectors where 150 out of 14,000 claimants were
represented by counsel and only 5 of the 150 objected to the settlement); Josephson v.
Campbell, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,347, at 97,658
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1969) (court stated that "the absence of objection by virtually the
entire body of stockholders" supported the presumption that the settlement was fair
and reasonable).
75. 3 H. Newberg, supra note 12, § 5610e.
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opt out if he does not wish to be bound by the settlement, a share-
holder in the context of an SEC enforcement proceeding must mani-
fest his desire to join in the settlement. 76 The court in Blinder Robin-
son recognized that the settlement was not binding on those who did
not elect to participate. 77 Accordingly, those shareholders were free
to pursue legal remedies against the settling defendants in separate
actions. Moreover, in the case of a partial settlement like the one in
Blinder Robinson, the shareholders may obtain additional relief from
the non-settling defendants78 irrespective of the shareholders' decision
to participate in the settlement.
The Blinder Robinson court attached some importance to the fact
that "only a few" objections to the settlement were received although
over eleven thousand notices were mailed to the shareholders." The
court further noted that those shareholders who appeared personally
favored the settlement.8 0 The court did not believe that its role was
"to play devil's advocate and represent those who [were] not there to
represent themselves.""' Rather, the court felt that the availability of
an opportunity to file objections, attend the hearing, make comments
and question the chief operating officer of the issuer constituted ade-
quate protection of the shareholders' interest. Thus, the court utilized
the underlying policy of the 1933 Act, that of maximizing disclosure,
rather than making or recommending investment decisions for indi-
viduals.8 2
Since the fairness hearing serves as a substitute for a registration
statement, it may be said that the procedure adopted by the court in
76. In an SEC enforcement proceeding, an "opt in" provision is the preferable
method of achieving maximum participation in the settlement. Because property
interests of absent and unrepresented parties may be affected, the alternative "opt
out' provision may raise an improper joinder issue. See Fletcher Aircraft Co. v.
Bond, 77 F.R.D. 47 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (judgment substantially affecting rights of
party who is not joined violates due process). An "opt in" provision gives shareholders
the right to participate in the settlement and binds only those shareholders who
affirmatively choose to participate. In Blinder Robinson, shareholders opted in by
sending a Proof of Claim and Release to the issuer. See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text. In an "opt out" situation, the shareholder is bound by the
settlement unless he affirmatively acts to exclude himself from the settlement. Feder
v. Harrington, 58 F.R.D. 171, 177 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. Reporters Transcript of Proceedings at 7, SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co.,
511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (statement of Judge Matsch on Apr. 10, 1981).
78. See Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 630 (D. Kan. 1976) ('poten-
tial recovery of the class is not necessarily limited to the amounts in the proposed
agreement between the plaintiffs and [the settling] defendants").
79. 511 F. Supp. at 802.
80. Id.
81. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings: Findings at 9, SEC v. Blinder Robinson
& Co., 511 F. Supp. 799 (D. Colo. 1981) (statement of Judge Matsch on Apr. 10,
1981).
82. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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Blinder Robinson-which gives shareholders notice of the proposed
settlement and an opportunity to comment on or object to its terms-
properly served ftle purposes of section 3(a)(10). Just as the SEC does
not judge the quality of the securities it approves for registration, the
judge in a fairness hearing should not pass on the quality of securities
issued in a settlement. Rather, just as the registration statement pro-
vides prospective shareholders the opportunity to judge for them-
selves, on the basis of full disclosure, the nature of the securities
offered, the fairness hearing allows shareholders to decide for them-
selves whether to accept the securities offered in the settlement. If the
shareholders choose not to attend the fairness hearing, they are no
worse off than offerees who do not read a registration statement.
Clearly, the court was correct in viewing its responsibility as that of
ensuring adequate disclosure.83
E. The Complexity, Expense and Duration of the
Litigation if the Settlement Is Not Approved
Although the expense of litigation is always present as a factor
supporting settlement, the court should nevertheless recognize the
burdens that continued litigation may place on both the company and
its shareholders. Not only is litigation extremely expensive, it also
distracts the officers from the running of the business and focuses their
energies on the task of defending the lawsuit. 84 This is particularly
true in securities cases, where the legal and factual issues are inevita-
bly complex and the allegations of the complaint frequently concern
the conduct of senior management. Recognizing these factors, one
commentator has stated that "[i]n most situations, unless the settle-
ment is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval is preferable
to lengthy and expensive litigation." 85
In a section 3(a)(10) hearing, the cost of continued litigation can be
adduced through expert testimony or by a representation to the court
by counsel for the settling defendants.86 The consequences of such
expenditures for litigation can then be analyzed by the expert witness.
83. The opinion, however, may have attached too much importance to the small
number of shareholders objecting to the settlement. See Haudek, supra note 42, at
800 ("silence of the stockholders does not relieve the court of its duties to the absent
[stockholders] but adds to its responsibility to reach an independent and objective
judgment").
84. Id. at 798; see United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Consumers Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 447 F.2d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 1971); cf. Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59
F.R.D. 353, 362 (S.D.N.Y.) (recapitalization effected through settlement will im-
prove corporation's economic prospects), aff'd mem. sub nom. Wesson v. Mississippi
River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973).
85. 3 H. Newberg, supra note 12, § 5610g, at 506 (footnote omitted).
86. See Haudek, supra note 42, at 801-02 (court has discretion to permit estimate
by counsel where expert testimony would be too expensive).
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F. The Risks of Litigation
Traditionally, courts have recognized the inherent risks of litigation
in determining whether to accept a proposed settlement.8 1 Courts
have sought to assess these risks by balancing the strength of plaintiff's
case-which turns on the possibility of establishing liability, the possi-
bility of proving damages and, in the case of class actions, the risk of
maintaining the class through the trial-against the amount offered in
the settlement. 8
Estimating the strength of plaintiff's case requires consideration of
whether the case involves "serious questions of law and fact which
place the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt."'89 Indeed,
courts frequently cite the existence of such questions as grounds for
approving settlements.90 In seeking approval of a settlement under
section 3(a)(10), counsel should emphasize the risks of establishing
liability, the likelihood of recovering damages or other relief and, in a
class action, the problems associated with establishing, notifying and
maintaining the class.
The utility of arguing the risks of litigation as a factor is signifi-
cantly affected by whether all the parties are settling or whether only
some of them are. When only certain of the defendants have agreed to
settle, the courts have recognized that the plaintiff does not want to
prejudice its case against the remaining defendants by conceding that
the weakness of its case induced it to settle. Accordingly, the courts
have deemphasized their inquiry into the weakness of the plaintiff's
case."' Thus, in Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc. ,2 a class action
brought under the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, the
court stated in approving the settlement that
87. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3rd Cir. 1975); Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 124 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 627 (D. Kan. 1976).
88. Haudek, supra note 42, at 793; e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55
F.R.D. 308, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp.
710, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1972).
89. Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 64 F.R.D. 597, 624 (D. Colo.
1974).
90. E.g., Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1039 (1972); Quirke v. Chessie Corp., 368 F. Supp. 558, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 64 F.R.D. 597, 625-27 (D. Colo. 1974);
Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.R.D. 353, 373 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mere. sub
nom. Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir. 1973).
91. Seiffer v. Topsy's Intl, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 622, 629 (D. Kan. 1976); see In re
National Student Mktg. Litig., 68 F.R.D. 151, 155-56 (D.D.C. 1974); ef. In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,120, at 77,589 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
2, 1979) (strength of plaintiffs case cannot be estimated with precision in the case of
a partial settlement because plaintiffs are naturally reluctant to reveal their case to
non-settling defendants).
92. 70 F.R.D. 622 (D. Kan. 1976).
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although plaintiffs' counsel . . . have no serious doubts about es-
tablishing the defendants' liability, we do not view this as necessar-
ily precluding approval. . . Class counsel are naturally reluctant
to expose their case to the full view of other parties who are still
actively litigating their positions and who are in direct opposition
to the stance of plaintiffs and the class.
[ . . T]he strength of plaintiffs' claims and hence their likeli-
hood of ultimate recovery ... is not totally dispositive of the
fairness of the proposed settlement. There are also the inherent
risks of litigation which weigh in the decision to settle rather than
to litigate. The risk of ultimately recovering money damages dogs
the heels of even able and zealous counsel, and this is especially
true in a case of this magnitude and complexity. The certainty of
fixed recovery by way of agreement is often preferable to the
vagaries of what might be achieved by a trial. 93
Because Blinder Robinson involved a partial settlement, the SEC
was understandably reluctant to discuss weaknesses in its case against
the issuer, given that it still had to try nearly identical factual and
legal issues against the remaining defendants before the same judge
who conducted the fairness hearing. The partial settlement of an SEC
enforcement proceeding also presents problems for the judge, because
he will be the finder of fact in the ongoing litigation."4
CONCLUSION
SEC v. Blinder Robinson & Co. opens new opportunities for practi-
tioners and courts to make innovative use of section 3(a)(10) in the
settlement of some SEC enforcement actions, and sets forth standards
for measuring fairness that can be employed in all securities litigation.
The section 3(a)(10) exemption provides a practical mechanism for
issuing securities in the settlement of securities litigation without the
expenses and problems associated with preparing and filing a registra-
tion statement. In addition, section 3(a)(10) allows issuers in a devel-
opmental stage to carry on their business and fulfill the goals of their
public offering instead of being forced into liquidation. Blinder
Robinson should be the first in a line of cases using this valuable
mechanism.
93. Id. at 629; see In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 68 F.R.D. 151, 155-56
(D.D.C. 1974); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 1980-1 Trade Gas. (CCH)
63,120, at 77,589 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1979).
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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